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This paper analyzes the individual bidding behavior of German banks in the money 
market auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of the third quarter of 2000 
to the end of the first quarter of 2001. Our approach takes a variety of characteristics of 
the individual banks into account. In particular, we consider variables that capture the 
different use of liquidity and the different attitude towards liquidity risk of the individual 
banks. It turns out that these characteristics are reflected in the banks’ respective bidding 
behavior to a large extent. Thus our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the 
way liquidity risk is managed in the banking sector. 
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*date revised. Original publication in May 2005.1 Introduction
An essential question for central banks is the equity and e￿ciency of the design of liquidity
provision. The European Central Bank injects liquidity into its banking system through a mech-
anism that di￿ers from the US system, where the Federal Reserve Bank repurchases Treasury
bills in open market operations with a small number of large counterparties. In the European
Monetary Union, the primary means for controlling the amount of liquidity is through money
market auctions, held once a week, in which any bank can bid for collateralized liquidity with
a two week maturity. Does the European system operate to the advantage of one set of banks
over another? If so, is this a set of banks one would want to support through the liquidity
system? Initial studies of this issue provided somewhat perplexing answers. Studies (such as
Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002)) with crude size data on banks indicated that larger
banks participated more in the liquidity auctions, suggesting, perhaps, that information about
the auction might be concentrated more in these banks, giving them an advantage. This con-
trasts with the design policy of the auctions, which was intended to provide an equal footing
to all participating banks, large and small.
The answer to the question of equity and e￿ciency depends crucially on how the various
banks use liquidity. Auction liquidity is of a very particular form that may ￿t the needs of
one group of banks over another, regardless of the information structure associated with the
conduct of the auction. Simply observing whether a large group of banks participates more in
an auction is not su￿cient to provide answers to the questions of either equity or e￿ciency.
One has to observe the auction in the context of a wide set of bank characteristics and in the
context of alternative markets for liquidity, each with their own set of risk characteristics and
prices. The very particular form of the auction liquidity provided by the ECB must also be
examined within this context of competing markets for liquidity and the particular needs of
di￿erent types of banks.
In this paper we analyze a unique data set that we have collected. It matches the individual
bidding behavior of German banks in the money market auctions with such bank characteristics
1as charter type, asset size, and the extent of the bank’s activity in the interbank market, an
alternative liquidity to that provided by the auction. We can observe the auction behavior of
individual banks in order to characterize di￿erent banks’ risk and their expected costs of running
out of liquidity. The data set includes auctions conducted by the ECB from the beginning of the
third quarter of 2000 to the end of the ￿rst quarter of 2001. We analyze the bidding behavior
of the di￿erent types of banks in the context of their liquidity needs, especially for the very
speci￿c form of liquidity o￿ered by the ECB auctions, in an environment of competing liquidity
sources.
Liquidity from the ECB is provided as a collateralized loan or repurchase agreement with
a two-week maturity. Banks know well in advance of an auction the minimum bid rate, below
which the ECB will not accept any bids. The banks submit a schedule of rates and the amounts
of liquidity they are willing to purchase at each rate.The ECB reports the aggregate amount of
liquidity it intends to inject into the system before the close of the auction. At the close of the
auction the ECB calculates the marginal lending rate. Each bid above the marginal lending
rate wins the liquidity at the rate that was bid. Bids at the marginal lending rate are awarded
liquidity on a prorated basis of the amount bid at that rate.
Within the week between any two such ￿repo￿auctions, the ECB in general does not in￿uence
the liquidity available to the banking system. Thus interest rates in the interbank market
may ￿uctuate, sometimes signi￿cantly. Two standing facilities, the Marginal Lending Facility
and the Deposit Facility, supplement the main re￿nancing operations. The Marginal Lending
Facility sets an interest rate at which banks can borrow unlimited amounts of liquidity against
collateral. At the Deposit Facility, banks can deposit excess liquidity with the ECB at a ￿xed
marginal deposit rate. These rates provide upper and lower bounds that limit the ￿uctuations
of the interbank overnight rate (the so-called "EONIA rate"). In general, when banks decide
their bidding strategy in the money market auctions, they balance the interest they have to pay
if they win a bid in the auction against the expected costs they face if they run out of liquidity
and have to draw on the secondary or interbank market.1 The costs that individual banks face
1As Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) show in their study, the interest rate in the interbank market
2when borrowing in the interbank market may vary signi￿cantly. Since the money market is
still mainly uncollateralized, rates also re￿ect the individual credit default risk. Thus, small
banks, which have a higher default probability on average, can be expected to pay higher rates.
However, in Germany, particularly small savings banks are usually provided with liquidity
from their respective head institutes (the so-called Landesbanks). Moreover, because of the
government guarantees for savings banks, even small savings banks do not have to pay much
of a risk premium in the interbank market. Thus their cost when borrowing in the interbank
market might be lower than those faced by commercial banks and credit cooperatives of a
similar size. Consequently, their bidding behavior might be less aggressive.
Furthermore, the liquidity needs (relative to bank size) may depend on several bank charac-
teristics. For example, big banks can net out large fractions of costumers’ payments internally
(because they have many customers on both sides of the settlement), whereas at small banks
most payments are external and thus require liquid funds. Similarly, banks involved in di￿erent
facets of the banking business may exploit economies of scope in their liquidity needs if the
di￿erent businesses have negatively correlated liquidity requirements.2
But more importantly for our analysis, also the probability of a liquidity need may vary
signi￿cantly between banks. A bank that is engaged in only one line of business faces a smaller
likelihood of a need for liquidity than a bank active in many ￿elds of business given the liquidity
needs of the speci￿c lines of business are not perfectly correlated. For example, most banks
provide lines of credit that must be met with very liquid assets. Just holding liquid reserves
against the risk that the customer will draw on these credit lines might not be optimal. A bank
only o￿ering credit lines may plan to borrow in the interbank market in case customers actually
draw on the lines of credit. Even though provide the required liquidity when the need arises
by borrowing in the interbank market is expost more costly, the expected costs might be lower
is on average higher than the marginal rate at which liquidity is allotted in the money market auctions. They
interpret that as a sign of underpricing following the winner’s curse problem. But, as we show, this may also
simply re￿ect an endogenous market segmentation.
2See Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) for a formal model of this argument.
3than the costs of holding the liquidity up front. In contrast, a bank that o￿ers lines of credit
and is at the same time also engaged in providing payment system services to other smaller
banks faces a higher probability of a liquidity need. For such a bank, a large liquidity bu￿er
might be e￿cient. Thus large banks, which o￿er a multitude of liquidity-intense services, are
more likely to demand liquidity while smaller, more specialized banks may be more dependent
on borrowing in the interbank market.
In contrast to the Fed, the ECB imposes much more restrictive minimum reserve require-
ments. In the United States, working balances that banks hold in order to clear payments,
bu￿er liquidity out￿ows, and so forth, exceed the required reserve holdings, whereas in the euro
area, liquidity held by each bank is generally determined by the reserve requirement.3 However,
these more restrictive reserve requirements in the Euro area need only be ful￿lled as a monthly
average.
If minimum reserve requirements are the binding constraint on a bank, should we really
observe the e￿ects of economies of scope or institutional structure in the bidding behavior for
liquidity? Clearly, taking minimum reserve requirements into account makes these suggestions
more subtle. If minimum reserve requirements exceed working balances, the di￿erent liquidity
needs will be re￿ected in the bank’s di￿ering bidding behavior in each of the four auctions
taking place during a single maintenance period. Banks with varied uses for liquidity should
have a continuing demand for liquidity over the entire maintenance period. They will therefore
continually bid for liquidity in the money market auctions. In contrast, banks with a rather
limited use for liquidity should try to acquire liquidity cheaply in the ￿rst auctions of a main-
tenance period by placing bids in the money market auction that are just slightly above the
minimum bid rate. By doing this, these banks can gamble on ful￿lling their reserve require-
ments cheaply. If they fail to win auction liquidity, then they can demand liquidity in the
interbank market from those banks with a wider spectrum of business activities, which win
liquidity in the auction by placing higher bids but turn out ex-post to need less liquidity.
3See Bindseil, Weller, and Wuertz (2003) for a broader discussion of that point.
4The literature that analyzes the framework of the ECB and particularly the bidding behavior
of the banks in the auctions has largely been concerned only with the mechanical question of how
to improve the operational framework from the perspective of monetary policy implementation.
However, these studies do not take any individual bank’s characteristics into account that could
reveal more about the structure of the liquidity demand of the banking sector. For example, a
recent study by Linzert, Nautz, and Breitung (2005), which analyzes the bidding behavior of
Hessian banks, only takes two very rough bank characteristics into account. In fact, maturing
allotments￿the liquidity obtained in the repo auction 14 days earlier￿are the only real bank-
speci￿c variable in this study. Even the size of the bank is captured by a crudely de￿ned dummy
variable, which divides the sample of banks into two groups based on the type of charter the
bank has (which is only broadly correlated with size). Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002)
study bidding behavior of all banks participating during the ￿rst year of the ECB’s variable-
interest-rate-tender auctions (starting in June 2000) from an auction-theory perspective. They
are particularly interested in the question of whether bigger banks have a competitive advantage
in the money auctions. They ￿nd that indeed bigger banks consistently borrow at lower rates
in the repo auctions than smaller banks just by using more bids dispersed at di￿erent values
within the same range as the smaller banks, and with more di￿erent bids at the extremes of
the range.
In contrast to these previous studies, our paper takes a much broader set of individual bank
characteristics into account. We do so because it is our general perception that in addition to
ful￿lling minimum reserve requirements, the driving force behind the demand for liquidity at
each individual bank is the actual opportunity cost of holding the liquidity. This opportunity
cost varies a great deal among di￿erent banks, as they have di￿erent uses for liquidity. Our
study is motivated by ￿ndings such as Fur￿ne (2000)’s for US banks. He shows that with higher
transaction volume in the payment system, banks have a higher risk of not meeting the reserve
requirement and therefore have a higher precautionary demand for liquidity. Liquidity use is
sensitive to the nature of the business that the particular bank is conducting.
5In our study, the larger banks use the auction liquidity more because they have a steady
liquidity need. They are driven by their inability to substitute lower-price liquidity intertem-
porally. Thus, spending resources to make the auction process more transparent may not have
the e￿ect of making the smaller banks more competitive. Moreover, according to our results,
favoring smaller banks at the expense of bigger institutions in the auctions would clearly be inef-
￿cient. This would not only bring about an ine￿cient liquidity allocation but also an ine￿cient
distribution of liquidity risk.
In sum, these intuitions have implications that are testable by matching the available data
on bidding behavior in the money market auctions with data on individual bank characteristics,
and in particular, their activity in the secondary market. Net lenders in the market should bid
more often and win more in auctions, particularly at the beginning of a maintenance period.
Net borrowers or smaller banks, who are less able to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope, are less likely to bid and should bid less. Thus, levels of activity in the auctions should
be higher for larger banks, payments banks, and banks with lots of action in the secondary
market as lenders.4
The rest of the paper starts with a description of the data we have assembled to study the
auctions. We then describe some simple reduced-form results from the data. The following
section describes our empirical procedures for the more complex estimations. The results of
our various procedures are fairly robust and consistent with each other, so that we are fairly
con￿dent in our conclusions.
2 Data
Our data consists of the bids submitted by all German banks that participated in the thirty-nine
liquidity auctions conducted by the European Central Bank from June 28, 2001, to March 21,
2002, and measures that describe various characteristics of all individual banks, both bidders
4Compare the intuition with results in Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) with respect of uncertainty
and reduced underpricing at the end of a maintenance period.
6and non-bidders. We matched the proprietary data of all bids submitted to ECB to balance
sheet data collected by the Bundesbank. This was a period of some interest rate volatility,
so that we can observe the behavior of di￿erent banks as they hedged against the interest
rate risk. The variables that we use can be ordered into three sets: ￿rst a set of variables
that describe all the the individual banks in Germany; second, a set of variables that describe
the environment of risk that characterizes a particular auction; and, ￿nally, the variables that
describe the individual bank’s bidding behavior and its outcome for a particular auction.
The variables PublicBanks and Commercial describe what a bank does, at least in terms
of its formal charter, and do not vary over the data period. PublicBanks is a dummy for
chartered Landesbanks and savings banks, whose primary purpose is to provide regionwide
￿nancial services as opposed to concentrating these services only in major metropolitan areas.
They are intended to serve a regional public interest rather than primarily to maximize pro￿ts.
However, they rely on retained pro￿ts to grow. Smaller savings banks obtain liquidity from
the Landesbanks and not through the formal interbank market. We expect the smaller savings
banks to be less involved and bid less aggressively in the auctions than other banks of the same
size. (We refer to these banks as ￿public￿throughout the paper.) In contrast, Commercial
is a dummy for the commercial banks. Besides the four big German commercial banks, this
mainly covers the regional commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, and the Postbank,
which is especially involved in payment system operations. This banking group is certainly the
most pro￿t or shareholder value oriented banking group. However, banks within that group
di￿er to a large extent with respect to the degree of specialization and business areas that they
are involved. Consequently, this group should follow most likely the patters described in the
introduction. For instance, we would expect that particularly small commercial banks that
are borrowers in the interbank market will vary their bidding behavior during the maintenance
period. The credit cooperatives are the control group. Credit cooperatives make up most of
the institutions in Germany. They are less focused on short-term pro￿t maximization than
the commercial banks. In the cooperative banking sector, smaller institutions often obtain
7liquidity outside the interbank market, from one of two banks, the WGZ Bank or the DZ Bank.
However, this network is less close than that between the Landesbanks and the savings banks.5
Coe￿cients on the dummy variables, Commercial and Public; are interpreted as di￿erences
between these two types of banks and the credit cooperatives.
Other bank characteristics did vary over the sample period, in particular, logassets, the log
of total assets of the bank, and reserve, the log of the minimum reserve requirement during
the settlement period of the auction. These variables measure the general size of the bank and
its automatic involvement in the liquidity market. It should be noted that the assets variable is
taken from monthly balance sheet data and re￿ects only the situation of the bank at the most
recent end-of-month date before the auction takes place.
Two variables that take into account the activity of the bank in the secondary overnight
market are more problematic in that end-of-month bank balance sheet data do not measure
a total ￿ow of funds into and out of the overnight market. Instead, what is available is a
snapshot of the banks’ activity on the last business day of the month. Clearly this is a noisy
proxy for bank liquidity activity in the overnight market. We average the activity in the
overnight market over the six months preceding the auction for both borrowing and lending
activity in the overnight funds market. Thus, Loans is the six-month average of lending in the
secondary market, divided by the bank’s reserve requirement, and Borrowings is the ratio of
borrowing in the secondary market to reserve requirement over the same period.
The second set of variables describes the risk environment faced by the banks in each auction.
These do not vary by bank, but they do vary over time. We measure the reaction of banks with
di￿ering characteristics by interacting the risk environment variables with the individual bank
variables described above. We tried many variables that measured the risk environment facing
the banks. The following variables measured the concepts that best re￿ect the risk and liquidity
trade-o￿s that banks consider when deciding whether to bid in the liquidity market or to obtain
necessary liquidity by other means:Maintenance end, Garch Eonia; Swap; Repo spread, and
5See Upper and Worms (2002) for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
8Forward spread. Clearly the risk of not ful￿lling the reserve requirements is particularly high
for some banks at the end of the maintenance period. Thus Maintenance end is a dummy that
is set to one for the last auction in the maintenance period.
Other risk-environment variables were obtained from ￿nancial time series. When banks
decide to whether to use the auction market or its chief competitor, the overnight short-term
liquidity market (the Eonia overnight market), the decision is based on interest-rate risks,
default risks, and so forth. These considerations represent partial equilibrium factors as opposed
to the general equilibrium factors that are of great importance to the monetary authority. These
partial equilibrium concerns center around the di￿erences between the two markets.
The auction market di￿ers from the Eonia market along several dimensions of risk, each
of which we try to measure by variables taken from the ￿nancial markets. First, the auction
liquidity is bid at a rate that gives a certain amount of liquidity at a ￿xed rate. However, whether
one really wins the bid is not known in advance. Thus auction liquidity is associated with an
￿auction risk.￿ In contrast, liquidity provision through the interbank market is associated with
interest rate risk, given that the Eonia market rate varies from day to day. We measure this risk
with a simple volatility measure, Garch Eonia; which is computed from daily Eonia data from
1999 onward with a simple Garch(1,1) estimated equation. If the interest rate risk associated
with liquidity through the overnight market is high, bidding for liquidity in the money market
auctions should be preferred.
However, using a two-week Eonia swap, a bank can hedge this interest rate risk. The Eonia
swap is a contract that exchanges a payment based on the ￿xed swap rate at the end of two
weeks (which we capture with Swap) for one based on the arithmetic average of the daily Eonia
rates during the same period. Thus the Eonia swap rate is the risk-free rate at which a bank
could receive liquidity for two weeks without incurring the auction risk.
In addition, the Eonia market di￿ers from the auction market in that loans are, for the most
part, unsecured. Thus there may be default risk associated with this market. We measure this
risk with the variable Repo spread, which is the spread between the swap rate for the unsecured
9Eonia market and the rate for the secured repo market, where short-term liquidity is purchased
with securities for two weeks, which are then repurchased at the end of the period. Thus, once
the variable rate risk is held constant with Swap variable, the Repo spread controls for the
default risk implicit in the Eonia rate.
To measure the risk-adjusted expected change in interest rates over the short run as per-
ceived by the markets, we include the variable, Forward spread, the spread between the current
Eonia rate and the one-week forward rate. This measures the expected gains from holding liq-
uidity now to ful￿ll the reserve requirements, instead of demanding liquidity in the next auction
in one week.
Broad correlations between the ￿ve measures of risk are shown in table 1. With the exception
of Forward spread, the measures during this period were generally uncorrelated with one
another. The ￿ve principal components that can be distilled from these ￿ve risk measures
all have some independent explanatory power. The smallest factor still accounts for about 8
percent of the variation. So while not completely orthogonal measures, these measured risk
factors still represent separate phenomena in the risk environment facing the banks during this
time period. However, it is not so much the impact of the di￿erent risk measures itself on the
bidding behavior of banks that we think is most interesting, it is more the interaction of these
variables with individual bank characteristics.
Table 1: Correlations between Risk Measures
Swap Garch Eonia Repo Spread Frwd Spread Last Maint.
Swap 1.000000 0.187132 0.119144 -0.168483 0.020116
Garch Eonia 0.187132 1.000000 -0.068635 -0.644300 0.204357
Repo Spread 0.119144 -0.068635 1.000000 -0.218478 -0.175798
Frwd Spread -0.168483 -0.644300 -0.218478 1.000000 -0.295231
Last Maint. 0.020116 0.204357 -0.175798 -0.295231 1.000000
Our dependent variables concern the bidding behavior of the banks. They can be divided
into two broad classes: those that capture whether and how the bank bid, and those that
capture the outcome of the bid. The ￿rst class contains three variables that summarize the
10Table 2: Means of Variables
















































Amount Won ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
117:63
(372:17)
Average Price Paid ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤
4:6842
(0:19236)
Observations 92,444 15,145 10,313
Variables described in the text.
Estimated standard deviations in parentheses.
bidding: One captures whether the bank bid in the auction, one captures the average bid for a
participating bank, and one summarizes the complexity of a bank’s bid behavior, speci￿cally,
the number of di￿erent price bids that it submitted. The second class of dependent variables
includes whether the bank won any liquidity, the quantity of liquidity won, and the quantity-
weighted price of the liquidity won. These variables are summarized in table 2.
Several patterns are clear from table 2. First, bidders are more likely to be larger banks
(in terms of total assets) than the population of all German banking institutions as a whole.
They are also much more likely to be Commercial or PublicBanks. Indeed, the PublicBanks
make up more than half of the bidders in the sample, although they represent only a tenth of
the total banks in the system. Banks that borrow in the overnight market are also more likely
11to bid and to win, while those that lend in the same market bid and win less often. This is
consistent with a naive view that there are lenders and borrowers in the short-term liquidity
market. Borrowers go to both the overnight and the auction markets, while lenders avoid the
auction market because they are already ￿ush with liquidity. This view is too naive, as we will
document later in this paper. The margin requirement is also positively associated with the












Liquidity " # # #
Supplier
Small
Commercial # " " "
Bank
Our framework that we outlined in the introduction predicts relationships between these
variables that di￿er from a more naive view of the uses of liquidity. The main predictions of our
approach are summarized in the table above. A liquidity supplier would be a large commercial
bank, and the other end of the spectrum might be represented by a small commercial bank.
The liquidity supplier, in our theory, is unable to intertemporally substitute liquidity, whereas
this ability is retained by the small commercial banks. So if the price of two week ￿xed rate
liquidity (which is the form of the auction liquidity) goes up, as represented by an increase in the
swap rate, then the liquidity supplier would be unable to substitute out of the auction liquidity,
whereas their opposites would be able to. Similarly, when alternative liquidity, represented by
the Repo Spread or the Future Spread gets pricier, then the liquidity supplier will be less able
to arbitrage into the less expensive auction liquidity, where the small commercial banks might
be able to. The end of the maintenance period spells a decline in the small banks’ ability to
intertemporally substitute, and so the predictions are reversed in this case.
123 The simple regression results
Measuring the e￿ect of bank characteristics on bidding behavior is complicated by the fact
that the amount bid is only measured for those banks who bid, and the amount won in a
bid is measured only for those banks who win. Thus, for example, if we want to see the
elasticity of the amount of liquidity won in an auction with respect to bank size, and how this
is in￿uenced by the swap rate, we need an unbiased estimate of the corresponding coe￿cient.
Simply regressing the logarithm of the amount won on observed variables that include the
logarithm of bank size does not give an unbiased estimate of the relevant coe￿cient because
the only banks included in the regression are those that won some amount. However, banks
that bid in our auctions may not be representative of banks as a whole. More importantly,
di￿erences between banks that win liquidity and banks in the general population may not be
easily measured with observable variables and may indeed be correlated with the error term
in a regression analysis, which makes the measurement less convincing in an argument about
bank behavior. In other words, we have a classic selection problem, where we know only the
bidding strategy of those banks that actually bid. To compensate for this problem, all of our
reported results have a Heckman (1976) correction included in the estimating equations, where
the standard errors of the estimate are also corrected for the censoring problem. We ￿nd that
all of our censoring terms are very signi￿cant, and that correcting for sample selection matters
signi￿cantly for our results.
In addition, the panel nature of our data set was accounted for, though not in a strict
￿xed-e￿ect method. Many of our variables did not change over the period of the data set, in
particular the Commercial and PublicBank dummies. The Loans and Borrowings variables
also represented weighted averages over a long time period, because these variables were ￿snap
shots￿ taken at the end of each month, used to measure a stock of behavior. A strict ￿xed-e￿ect
estimation technique is not appropriate in equations that contain this variable. As a result,
the standard errors for the estimates reported in this paper re￿ect a correction for the random-
e￿ects estimation procedure used, as well as a correction for the heteroscedasticity induced by
13the ￿rst-stage estimation.6
The main results of our basic regressions are summarized in table 3. Each column represents
a separate regression of bid behavior. The ￿rst column describes the results from the probit on
the likelihood of participation in an auction. The coe￿cients in the second column detail the
e￿ect on the amount bid in an auction, given that a bank participated in the auction. The third
column reports coe￿cients of a probit on whether the bank won liquidity in an auction, and
the fourth column reports the coe￿cients on the amount won, given that some liquidity was
won by the bank. The ￿fth column presents the quantity-weighted price paid for the liquidity
won by a bank, given that some liquidity was won. The t-values for the respective estimates
are given in brackets.
The main results concerning the e￿ect of the price and risk measures on the bidding behavior
of the banks in our sample are intuitively rather convincing. If the price for 14-day liquidity
in the interbank market (measured by Swap) is high and therefore the expected marginal bid
price is high, the participation as well as the total amounts bid and won are low. Instead
of demanding two-week liquidity, banks will try to obtain the liquidity needed by drawing on
the overnight market or by substituting the ful￿llment of the minimum reserve requirement
intertemporally.
Interestingly, an increase in Swap causes almost an equal increase in the weighted price
at which banks receive liquidity in the money market. This is consistent with the view that
the swap rate is a good predictor of the marginal rate outcome at the end of the auction.
However, the coe￿cient of Swap is slightly but signi￿cantly larger than one. This suggests
that the auction risk, measured as the discount of the weighted price paid for liquidity received
in the auctions over the swap rate, is higher during phases of lower money market rates. This
may re￿ect the gambling of smaller banks in the auctions at the beginning of the maintenance
period, when liquidity is comparably cheap. These banks bid more aggressively in times of
serious liquidity need, for instance at the end of the month (when derivative contracts are often
6Other error schemes in which a ￿xed e￿ect may be correlated with variables such as log assets are investigated
in a second paper.
14settled), and when money market rates are typically high.
Although the Repo spread has no signi￿cant e￿ect on the probability of participation or
the amount bid, it is strongly correlated with the weighted price paid for liquidity in the money
market auction. Thus an increase in the mark-up for uncollateralized interbank loans goes
along with a higher weighted price paid for liquidity in the auctions, as banks substitute out of
the uncollateralized market.
A higher volatility of the overnight rate has a positive e￿ect on the probability of partici-
pation in money market auctions and increases the total amount bid. This is basically in line
with the intuition that a higher interest rate risk makes banks less willing to bear the risk of
having to turn to the overnight market to obtain additional liquidity. The average price at
which banks receive liquidity in the auctions is negatively a￿ected by a higher volatility in the
overnight rate, which is re￿ected in an increase in Garch Eonia. This is consistent with the
view that the monetary authority makes liquidity available at a lower price in times of higher
interest rate volatility.
The negative e￿ect of an expected price increase on participation and bidding in the auc-
tions, which is re￿ected in a rise in Swap; is largely compensated for if market participants
expect a further interest rate hike at the next auction. This is shown in the strong and signif-
icant coe￿cient of Forward spread. However, an expected interest rate increase at the next
auction has a small but signi￿cantly negative e￿ect on the weighted average price of liquidity
in this auction, which is counterintuitive.
All these price and risk measures obviously do not fully re￿ect the usually tighter liquidity
situation at the end of the maintenance period. The results show an independent, positive end-
of-maintenance-period e￿ect on participation and on the weighted price at which participating
banks won liquidity in the auctions. However, the amounts bid and the amounts won are on
average lower at the end of the maintenance period. This may re￿ect the fact that the partici-
pating banks only try to provide the liquidity they really need for themselves ￿ particularly for
the ful￿lment of their own minimum reserve requirements ￿ instead of bidding to o￿er larger
15parts of the liquidity in the interbank market.
Similar to previous studies, our results also provide evidence that larger banks have a higher
participation rate and tend to bid more in the ECB auctions than smaller banks.7 They may
use more sophisticated bidding strategies, as pointed out in Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev
(2002), which may explain why they nevertheless manage to pay less for the liquidity won.
However, they bid less per dollar of asset owned, and they win less absolutely than the other
banks.
Our results rather robustly point out that banks that have excess liquidity, which they use
to grant loans in the interbank market, are less likely to participate in the auctions. In contrast,
banks that are collecting liquidity in the interbank market have a higher participation rate in
the auctions. However, given that they bid, banks that are active in the interbank market,
whether on the borrowing or on the lending side, tend in general to place larger bids and win
larger amounts in the money market auctions. This larger involvement in the interbank market
in general might therefore also explain why larger borrowing as well as lending in the interbank
market reduces the weighted price these banks pay in the auctions.
There are important di￿erences in the bidding behavior of the three German banking system
sectors. Our results show that commercial banks are far more likely to bid in auctions than the
control group ￿ credit cooperatives. In contrast, the likelihood of public banks participating
is substantially lower.8 While in general the participation of larger banks is more likely, this
size e￿ect is more distinct for commercial banks than for credit cooperatives and especially for
the public sector. The size of a public bank is less important for determining the total amount
bid than for commercial banks or credit cooperatives. The size of the bank does not have a
signi￿cant e￿ect for the amounts that public banks win, while size increases this amount for
commercial banks and reduces it for credit cooperatives. Public and commercial banks do not
signi￿cantly di￿er in the weighted price that they pay at auction. On average, they both pay
7See for instance, Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) and Linzert, Nautz, and Breitung (2005).
8The public banks make up a larger fraction of the bidding banks than their numbers in the population
would suggest. However, this is because of the other measured characteristics of the public banks, which have
positive e￿ects on the probability of bidding.
16a lower price than credit cooperatives. However, larger commercial and public banks pay a
higher price than credit cooperatives of the same size.
Altogether these results show that the structure of the German banking system is strongly
re￿ected in the bidding behavior of the banks in the money market auctions. The particularly
close relationship between the Landesbanks and the savings banks in the public bank sector
brings about a specialization in liquidity provision within this group of strongly associated
banks. Only a comparatively small fraction of public banks consisting mostly of the larger
ones (particularly the Landesbanks) participates in the money market auctions. However, once
public banks participate, they tend to place higher bids and win larger amounts than any other
banking group. Presumably they pass this liquidity, to some extent, on to smaller savings
banks. In addition, they also provide the liquidity-intensive services for these smaller banks. In
sum, this enables the public banks to obtain liquidity through the auction more e￿ciently than
the credit cooperatives and at an average price similar to the commercial banks. However, given
that a bank participates in the auction, the price it pays on average is higher the larger the bank.
This is especially true for public and commercial banks. Correcting for the censoring problem,
our results, particularly for commercial and public banks, provide an answer which stands in
sharp contrast to Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002), who report a lower average price
paid by larger banks. Our result is consistent with the view that smaller banks are simply taking
advantage of their intertemporal substitution opportunities and speculating in the auction to
win low-cost liquidity.
4 The interaction of risk measures and individual banks’
characteristics
A main interest of our study lies in the interaction of the characteristics of the individual banks
with the di￿erent risk measures and their combined e￿ect on the bidding behavior in the money
market auction. The way di￿erent banks adjust their bidding strategies in the money market
auctions to changes in the di￿erent risk measures over time reveals much about the styles of
17risk management and risk allocation among di￿erent types of banks in the German banking
system.
Two approaches are used to measure the joint e￿ect of bank characteristics and risk mea-
sures on bidding behavior. In one approach we ￿rst run a separate set of probit equations
and censored regressions for each of the weekly auctions. The coe￿cients of the individual
bank characteristics from these regressions are themselves then regressed on a set of time se-
ries variables ￿ namely the time series of the risk measures. Thus, the coe￿cients from the
regressions and probits are, themselves, treated as time series variables. The advantage of this
￿rst strategy is that it is fairly useful with large data sets as an exploratory device. Breaking
up the estimation allows one to quickly estimate separate coe￿cients, using only data from
that auction, and to assemble them later in a second step. Many possible time series patterns
in the data are easily seen in the second step, because we can subject our results to classical
speci￿cation tests, just as we would for any classical time series variable. In the regressions
of coe￿cients on the interest rate variables, the Durbin-Watson statistics, for example, were
generally within the 5% bounds, so that estimating our panel using time series e￿ects seems to
be unwarranted.
But while this ￿rst approach has an advantage in exploration of the data, it has the disad-
vantage of not using the variance structure to its fullest extent to create estimates with smaller
standard errors. So we also use a second approach and treat our sample more classically, running
a censored regression model on the full sample at once. The interaction of bank characteristics
and risk environment e￿ects are measured by the coe￿cients on cross e￿ects in classical probits
and censored regressions. As in the work above, we correct the standard errors to handle the
e￿ects of cross covariances of the error term within the same auction and of heteroscedasticity
due to the estimated Heckman correction in the ￿rst stage. After our speci￿cation is decided,
we run our well-speci￿ed model on all of the data to achieve smaller standard errors.
Another advantage of the ￿rst (two-step) approach is an increased ease in seeing the in￿uence
of speci￿c auctions on the data. If, for example, there is an unusual auction in terms of who bid
18on or who won liquidity, then a quick graph of the time series of the coe￿cients will point it out.
It is this procedure that showed us the necessity of tossing out the auction of September 27,
2000. Coe￿cients estimated from this auction were many orders of magnitude di￿erent from all
other auctions, and represented large outliers for every coe￿cient. This certainly represented
the very di￿erent liquidity environment created by the massive foreign currency intervention
that the ECB, Federal Reserve, and Bank of England conducted on the date of the auction.
We exclude this auction.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the regressions of coe￿cients on the risk environment
variables. The ￿rst row represents the coe￿cients and standard errors of the regression of the
separate Borrower coe￿cients (where each observation is a separate coe￿cient obtained from
a single auction) on the risk environment variables. Each row represents a separate regression,
each of which has 37 observations, one for each auction. The coe￿cient reported for Swap in
the Borrower row, Amount Bid; thus reports the e￿ect of an increase in the swap rate on the
responsiveness of Borrowers to bid more in auctions.
Apparently, the di￿erent groups of banks react most characteristically to changes in Swap.
The swap rate represents the price of a close substitute for auction liquidity (and as noted
earlier is the best predictor of the auction’s marginal rate), although it does not include the
auction risk. Thus, when the swap rate goes up, those banks that do not have a continuous
need for liquidity should drop out of the market, as they try to intertemporarily substitute the
ful￿lment of their minimum reserve requirement. Compared to other banks, the amount bid
by banks that cannot intertemporarily substitute goes up. These banks are the large banks
with various businesses. Similarly, banks that tend to be lenders in the interbank market
increasingly demand larger amounts in the auction. Those are the banks that have￿because of
their particular business strategies￿a high demand for liquidity. If they have excess liquidity,
they supply it to the market.
However, those banks that can intertemporarily substitute seem to speculate in the auctions
trying to raise liquidity at a low price. Borrowers in the interbank market are supposedly banks
19that do not have a continuous liquidity need and therefore ful￿ll their occasional liquidity
needs by demanding liquidity from other banks in the interbank market. By placing bids at
particularly low prices in the auctions, they can, however, speculate on winning cheap liquidity.
This is why their probability of bidding increases with a higher Swap, while the amount bid
and won does not change. In contrast, the probability of lenders and larger banks bidding
goes down. This might re￿ect the fact that these banks￿because of their continuous liquidity
needs￿are less willing to incur the auction risk (which supposedly increases in periods of higher
interest rates).9
In addition, smaller savings banks and credit cooperatives seem to draw more heavily on
their respective internal liquidity suppliers, either the WGZ or the DZ bank, in times of high
interest rates. Consequently, the liquidity demand of (smaller) commercial banks in the auctions
increases relative to these savings banks and credit cooperatives. Admittedly, this explanation
strikes us as perhaps the most puzzling of our exposition, in that we would have thought the
smaller commercial banks would substitute intertemporally when the swap rate is high.
The Garch measurement represents interest risk in the Eonia market, as seen in its volatility.
This measure seems to be associated with the behavior of the larger banks. When the volatility
is high, bigger banks intensify their participation in the money market auctions. In particular,
larger banks may not be able to hedge their entire short-term interest rate risk in the interbank
market using swaps. Receiving liquidity at a ￿xed rate for 14 days might be particularly
appealing for these banks if interest rate volatility is high.
In addition, small commercial banks seem to react to an increase in Garch. The higher
Garch is, the more likely smaller commercial banks are to win in a liquidity auction. Inciden-
tally, for many of the risk measures, it is the smaller commercial banks that are more likely
to win something in a liquidity auction. In this regard, the larger commercial banks behave
9ALTERNATIVE VIEW: Oddly, when the swap rates are lower, the number of lenders in the money market
bidding in an auction goes up. However, the amount bid actually goes down. This is consistent with bank
lending in the money market having two components: banks who are taking advantage of the opportunities to
balance their lending portfolios, and (often smaller) banks that lend when they have excess cash. These banks,
which are in the funds markets almost ￿accidentally,￿ make up more of the auction market than the careful
liquidity portfolio managers, when the swap market is an attractive substitute for the auction market.
20more like large banks. Another way of putting it is that the large banks, whether commercial
or otherwise, are likely to win something in nearly every auction, so that whether they win is
not dependent on the risk environment. However, increasing the interest rate risk, or the risk
of default, or the risk of running short of reserve requirements at the end of the maintenance
period all make it more probable that the smaller commercial banks (as opposed to the smaller
banks) will win something in a liquidity auction.
However, an increase in the repo spread that measures the default risk not only brings the
smaller commercial banks into the liquidity auctions (so that they bid to win), it also brings
the public banks as well. This is rather puzzling. Given government guarantees for public
banks, the rates those banks have to pay in the interbank market should be least a￿ected by an
increasing default risk spread. Interestingly, the default risk also causes the larger commercial
banks to win more liquidity, but at a smaller price in terms of the auction risk.
The risk approximated by the futures spread is rather subtle and has to do with the timing
of the ful￿lment of the minimum reserve requirement. It measures the gain from ful￿lling the
minimum reserve requirement currently, as opposed to after the following ECB auction. Thus,
banks that hold liquidity only to ful￿ll the minimum reserve requirement can try to substitute
the liquidity intertemporally in order to ful￿ll the requirement. As the estimates show, the
small commercial banks in particular behave in this way. If an increase in Spread signals an
increase in the money market rates after the next auction, they are more likely to participate
in the auction, and they are even more willing to pay an excess price. However, the amounts
they win are negatively a￿ected by an increase in the forward spread. Those banks that win
a signi￿cantly larger amount in times of higher forward spreads are the public banks. Here it
might be the fact that small savings banks often need liquidity to ful￿ll their minimum reserve
requirement more than the small commercial banks do. In contrast, the large commercial banks
cannot substitute their liquidity holdings intertemporally within one month. They have a large,
continuous need for liquidity for their everyday business. They do not gain from increasing their
liquidity demand in the money market auction if an interest rate increase is expected after the
21next auction. Consequently, as our data show, they are even less likely to bid if the forward
spread indicates an expected interest rate increase.
The end of the maintenance period bears the risk of not meeting the reserve requirement.
This results in more lenders winning some liquidity. This is consistent with the view that
lenders in the interbank market provide the liquidity (risk) management for other banks to
a large extent. At the end of the maintenance period liquidity risk at those banks that only
need liquidity to ful￿l the reserve requirement rises. Thus money market lenders that provide
the liquidity management to these banks face a higher risk that they actually have to pro-
vide liquidity to these banks. Consequently, the money market lenders have to increase their
bu￿ers so that they are not caught short when their customers need to borrow to ful￿ll their
reserve requirement. In contrast to the small savings banks and credit cooperatives, the smaller
commercial banks might not be able to fully draw on the liquidity management of other large
banks. Thus they ￿ at least partially ￿ increase their likelihood of winning additional liquid-
ity themselves when they run the risk of not meeting the minimum reserve requirement at the
end of the maintenance period. Similarly, those banks with larger reserve requirements (ceteris
paribus) are more likely to win in a liquidity auction as they reach the end of the maintenance
period, and they also bid a higher price.
The coe￿cients of the interaction terms between individual banks’ characteristics and the
various risk measures estimated with the second pooled approach are presented in table 5.
These coe￿cients are reported from regressions and probits that use our entire sample in a
single estimation. The standard errors of both the probits and the tobit estimates are adjusted
both for the fact that the observations within a single auction share a common factor and for
the fact that the errors in the second step of the estimation are heteroscedastic.
The signs and the signi￿cance levels of the coe￿cients of the various interaction terms for
the two-step approach are also reported in table 5. Table 5 is arranged somewhat di￿erently
than table 3, in that the columns represent the risk environment variable that is multiplied
by the bank characteristic variable in the row. Each bank characteristic variable is listed for
22￿ve separate estimations. For example, the row labelled Borrower and Amount bid represents
coe￿cients in the regression on the amount bid by the bank. The coe￿cient in the Garch
column is the coe￿cient on the cross e￿ect of the Borrower variable multiplied by the Garch
variable. Only the ￿ve estimations (two probits on Participation and Winning, and three
second-step regressions on Amount bid, Amount won; and Excess price) are represented in
this table, though we report all of the cross e￿ects. We arrange the table this way to facilitate
comparison with table 4. The estimates of table 5 di￿er from the time series estimates of table
4, in that they impose more structure in terms of the common error term, a factor that is
shared across all observations, as well as a stability of parameters that is maintained across all
periods. If our imposed speci￿cation of the estimating equations is correct, more might be said
about the behavior of banks. Interestingly, the results of the large regressions reported in table
5 are sensitive to the assumptions made about the form of the error structure. We report the
estimates where the contemporaneous error term is correlated across observations experiencing
the same auction because they provide a more reliable indication of which estimated coe￿cients
are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.10
A look at the coe￿cients of table 5 largely con￿rms the results of table 4. Indeed, the new
results di￿er from the results of table 4 in only four coe￿cients that are signi￿cantly di￿erent
from zero. Each of the four coe￿cients are in the cross products with the swap rate. Two of the
coe￿cients indicate that smaller banks are less likely to bid and win liquidity when the swap
rate is high. These coe￿cients were insigni￿cantly di￿erent from zero in table 4 but are now
statistically signi￿cant. In this case, the increased structure imposed in table 5 yields estimates
that support our discussion above more strongly. The swap rate will a￿ect the auction behavior
of those banks that can intertemporally substitute liquidity, such as the smaller banks. These
coe￿cients are completely in accord with this hypothesis.
Two of the cross coe￿cients with the swap rate reported in table 5 indicate that commercial
banks are also less likely to win liquidity, although this is attenuated by size: the larger banks
10Using the stronger assumption that each observation is uncorrelated with every other observation yields
estimated coe￿cients that are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero in almost every case.
23are more likely to behave like other large banks. These two coe￿cients, of all the coe￿cients
that we report in tables 4 and 5, are the only two where the coe￿cients of the two tables
are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero and of opposite sign. In the scenario reported in table 5,
smaller commercial banks will substitute out of the expensive auction liquidity as represented
by the price of the swap for 14-day liquidity. This is more consistent with our story that smaller
commercial banks deal in liquidity forms that allow them to substitute intertemporally for their
liquidity needs. As such, this pair of coe￿cients seem to us more convincing than the ones in
table 4, where a more complicated story was required. Having said that, however, what strikes
an empirical researcher is the consistency of estimates across the two very di￿erent techniques.
For a such a large number of cross e￿ects, to have such a consistent story for all but two of the
numbers is remarkable.
5 Conclusion
The data from the ECB auctions provides a unique opportunity to study the bidding behavior
of di￿erent banks and uncover the liquidity management of di￿erent groups of banks in response
to changes in the risk environment.
Our results show that the liquidity management of di￿erent groups of banks is strongly
in￿uenced by their ability to intertemporally substitute their liquidity demand. If a bank needs
liquidity only to satisfy margin requirements, and the end of the maintenance period is not
near, then the bank can always speculate to win liquidity in the auctions by low-balling its
bids. The banks that use this strategy and reduce their bidding in the auction if the current
price for liquidity is high exhibit the following characteristics in our study. They are smaller
banks, borrowers in the interbank market, and are smaller commercial banks. Small public
banks do not respond to the risk environment because they are, to a large extent, provided
with liquidity from the Landesbanks. Other banks have continual liquidity requirements and
cannot substitute intertemporally. For these banks, the 14-day liquidity o￿ered by the money
auctions is advantageous because it ￿xes the price of the liquidity that they will need with high
24probability. These banks include the larger, typically commercial banks. They also include
the lenders in the interbank market because their needs arrive stochastically, and they will
occasionally have excess liquidity.
Moreover, if the market expects a future increase in money market rates￿as indicated by
an increase in the future spread￿then smaller commercial banks intertemporally adjust their
bidding behavior and are therefore more likely to participate in the current money market
auction and are even willing to pay an excess price. This strategy seems to provide the smaller
banks and those that are borrowing in the interbank market with cheap liquidity before the end
of the maintenance period, because in the last auction of a maintenance period, larger banks
and those that are lenders in the interbank market bid particularly aggressively.
In addition, the bidding behavior of each bank also responds to the risk premia that the
respective bank has to pay in the interbank market. Small commercial banks￿those banks that
supposedly have the highest default probability￿bid more aggressively in the money market
auctions as the spread between collateralized and uncollateralized interbank loans increases.
Obviously, the results of our study required the use of disaggregated data, which includes
measurement of attributes of the bidding institutions. Our ￿ndings regarding the heterogeneity
in the bidding behavior could not have been made using aggregate data. Moreover, the results of
our analysis required the use of statistical techniques for analyzing data sets that had censoring
in order to uncover the patterns of liquidity behavior. Use of less rich data, without accounting
for censoring, can lead to misleading results. These results include some of the literature’s
￿ndings of ￿nancial variables not in￿uencing auction behavior. In contrast, our measures of
the risk environment, while clearly not complete, each showed a separate aspect of liquidity
risk, and each a￿ected the bidding behavior of di￿erent sets of banks in di￿erent ways and to
a di￿erent degree.
Other studies have emphasized the information structure of the auctions, which might un-
fairly favor larger banks at the expense of smaller ones. Our study has a di￿erent take on
this. In our study, the larger banks use the auction liquidity more because they have a steady
25liquidity need. They are driven by their inability to substitute lower-price liquidity intertempo-
rally. Spending resources to make the auction process more transparent may not have the e￿ect
of making the smaller banks more competitive. Moreover, according to our results, favoring
smaller banks at the expense of bigger institutions in the auctions would clearly be ine￿cient.
This would not only bring about an ine￿cient liquidity allocation but also an ine￿cient distri-
bution of liquidity risk.
Clearly analyzing the liquidity behavior in these auctions and relating this behavior to data
on bank characteristics is a fertile ￿eld, and further research in using these data promise to be
fruitful. For example, a more structural model of liquidity management and allocation of liq-
uidity risk within the banking sector should provide for a richer set of policy recommendations.
Further, such structure should allow for more precise testing of the models and provide more
clues to counterfactual investigation.
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